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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
ROSENN, Circuit Judge. 
 
This appeal has its genesis in the intense commercial 
rivalry between two insurers licensed in Pennsylvania to 
underwrite health insurance plans. This rivalry erupted in 
advertisements that appeared in the Pittsburgh Post-Gazette 
in February 2001. We had occasion almost a decade ago to 
observe the "dynamic role" commercial advertising plays in 
the financial and industrial activities of our society. Castrol 
Inc. v. Pennzoil Co., 987 F.2d 939, 940-41 (3d Cir. 1993). 
Whether the McCarran-Ferguson Act (the McCarran Act), 
15 U.S.C. SS 1011-1015, bars a false advertising claim by 
an insurer against another insurer under Section 43(a) of 
the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. S 1125(a)(1)(B), is an issue of 
first impression in this court. 
 
Alleging that UPMC Health Plan, Inc. (UPMC), one of the 
foregoing insurers, published full-page advertisements (the 
UPMC ad or the Ad) in the Pittsburgh Post-Gazette in 
February 2001 containing deceptive misstatements in 
comparing insurance plans offered by UPMC and 
Highmark, Inc. (Highmark), the other insurer, Highmark, 
promptly sought injunctive relief and damages in the 
United States District Court for the Western District of 
Pennsylvania. The bases for its action are that the UPMC 
ad contained false statements and deceptive advertising in 
violation of Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, state common 
law claims of commercial disparagement, and intentional 
interference with contractual relations. 
 
UPMC moved to dismiss the action for lack of subject 
matter jurisdiction, contending that neither its Ad, nor the 
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services mentioned therein, substantially affect interstate 
commerce as required under Section 43(a) of the Lanham 
Act. UPMC later asserted that plaintiff 's Lanham Act claims 
also were proscribed by the McCarran Act and the 
Pennsylvania Unfair Insurance Practices Act (UIPA), 40 PA. 
CONS. STAT. ANN. SS 1171.1-.15 (1999). After a two-day 
hearing, the District Court denied the motion to dismiss 
and granted Highmark's motion for a preliminary 
injunction. In granting the injunction, the District Court 
found that UPMC's ad contained nine separate literally false 
statements. The Court also found that UPMC's advertising 
had a tendency to deceive the intended readers. The Court's 
order required UPMC to cease and desist further 
dissemination of its Ad and any other false and deceptive 
advertisements or marketing materials containing a claim 
specifically found by the District Court to be false and 
misleading. UPMC timely appealed to this Court. We affirm. 
 
I. 
 
As a licensed insurer, UPMC offers two health insurance 
plans marketed solely to employers and subscribers in 
Western Pennsylvania, the Enhanced Access Point of 
Service plan and the Enhanced Access HMO plan. 
Highmark, also a licensed insurer, offers three health 
insurance plans under its CommunityBlue umbrella, 
including its CommunityBlue Direct plan. The 
CommunityBlue Direct plan is also marketed solely to 
employers and subscribers in Western Pennsylvania. Both 
UPMC plans and Highmark's CommunityBlue Direct plan 
are network-based plans. As such, they utilize the services 
of hospitals and physicians under contract with the plan to 
provide health care to subscribers. UPMC's plans and 
Highmark's plan make their services available outside of 
their respective networks, but at a greater cost to the 
subscriber, through deductibles and co-payments. 
 
The County of Allegheny chose the UPMC health plans 
and the Highmark CommunityBlue Direct plan as the 
exclusive health insurance plans offered to the County's 
non-union employees during the open enrollment period 
beginning on February 1, 2001. On February 1 and 
February 4, 2001, UPMC published full-page 
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advertisements in the Pittsburgh Post-Gazette  comparing 
various features of UPMC's and Highmark's plans. The top 
of the Ad states "A message to the employers of Allegheny 
County," and asks "If you were diagnosed with a serious 
illness tomorrow, which health plan would you rather 
have?" The District Court found nine statements in the Ad 
(including seven statements comparing UPMC and 
Highmark health care plans) were false and misleading. 
 
The District Court reviewed the prerequisites for a 
preliminary injunction. Based on its findings of fact, it 
concluded that Highmark had established that it was likely 
to succeed on the merits and that it would suffer 
irreparable injury if injunctive relief were denied. The Court 
also balanced the hardship to the parties and considered 
the public interest. On balance, it reasoned that the 
injunction would prevent UPMC "from gaining an unfair 
advantage in its competition with Highmark" and that the 
public interest would best be served by a cessation of the 
Ad and the publication of a corrective advertisement. It 
thereupon granted the application for the injunction. 
 
II. 
 
On appeal, UPMC raises two significant legal issues. 
First, it claims the Ad does not substantially affect 
interstate commerce, and thus there is no Lanham Act 
jurisdiction. It also claims that the McCarran Act bars the 
application of the Lanham Act, because to do so would 
invalidate, impair, or supersede Pennsylvania's Unfair 
Insurance Practices Act. 
 
First, we address the jurisdictional issues with respect to 
Highmark's Lanham Act claim. This is essentially a legal 
issue and our standard of review is plenary. United States 
Sec. & Exch. Comm'n v. Infinity Group Co., 212 F.3d 180, 
186 n.6 (3d Cir. 2000). 
 
UPMC argues that the Lanham Act's interstate commerce 
requirement is not met because it directed its Ad to 
employees of Allegheny County, Pennsylvania, and the 
advertised health plans are sold only in Pennsylvania. 
Thus, it maintains that there is no substantial effect on 
interstate commerce. The District Court rejected this 
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argument, holding that the Ad does indeed substantially 
affect interstate commerce. 
 
A. 
 
The Lanham Act provides civil liability for any person 
who "uses in commerce" any false or misleading description 
or representation of fact which in commercial advertising 
misrepresents the nature, characteristics, or qualities of 
any person's services or commercial activities. 15 U.S.C. 
S 1125(a)(1)(B). The term "commerce," as used in the Act, 
refers to "all commerce which may lawfully be regulated by 
Congress." 15 U.S.C. S 1127. It has long been 
acknowledged that the Act "confers broad jurisdictional 
powers upon the courts of the United States." Steele v. 
Bulova Watch Co., 344 U.S. 280, 283 (1952); accord U.S. 
Healthcare, Inc. v. Blue Cross, 898 F.2d 914, 922 (3d Cir. 
1990) ("The commerce requirement has been broadly 
interpreted."). Congress's authority under the interstate 
commerce clause extends even to purely intrastate activity 
if that activity substantially affects interstate commerce. 
United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558-59 (1995). 
 
The District Court held that five nexi substantially affect 
interstate commerce. First, the Pittsburgh Post-Gazette is 
distributed interstate and, therefore, the Ad appeared 
outside Pennsylvania. Second, the health plans referred to 
in the advertisements offer emergency care to patients 
outside of Pennsylvania. Third, the Highmark plan applies 
to subscribers residing outside of Pennsylvania, and 
services may be provided to a subscriber's dependents who 
reside outside of Pennsylvania. Fourth, subscribers may be 
referred to a hospital or medical facility outside of 
Pennsylvania. Finally, the Ad might have an impact on the 
parties outside of Pennsylvania. UPMC does not challenge 
the Court's factual findings, appealing only the Court's 
holding that these facts are sufficient to give the Court 
Lanham Act jurisdiction. 
 
The District Court's findings relating to the health plan 
services offered outside of Pennsylvania support its 
conclusion with respect to interstate commerce. Cynthia 
Dellecker, Highmark's vice president of product 
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management and development, testified that 
CommunityBlue Direct covers subscribers' dependents 
residing outside of Pennsylvania, and that CommunityBlue 
Direct offers emergency care outside of the state and 
country. She also testified that CommunityBlue Direct 
subscribers have access to out-of-state hospitals such as 
Sloan-Kettering, the Cleveland Clinic, Massachusetts 
General Hospitals, and the Mayo Clinic. Dr. Kenneth 
Melani, the executive vice president of Highmark for 
strategic business development and health services, 
testified that Highmark has approved care for subscribers 
at Sloan-Kettering. Melani further noted that Joslin Clinic, 
a CommunityBlue Direct network hospital situated in 
Boston, Massachusetts, is an internationally recognized 
diabetes treatment center. 
 
John DeGruttola, the chief marketing officer for UPMC, 
acknowledged that Highmark has arrangements with the 
Cleveland Clinic and Johns Hopkins University, situated in 
Baltimore, Maryland. Moreover, UPMC covers medical 
emergency care outside Pennsylvania, and, according to 
DeGruttola, he's "never had a complaint come across . . . 
that said th[e UPMC] card wasn't recognized across the 
United States or in the world." The record testimony amply 
supports the District Court's conclusion with respect to the 
substantial effect on interstate commerce. 
 
B. 
 
We turn now to UPMC's contention that the McCarran 
Act and Pennsylvania's UIPA bar application of the Lanham 
Act. Because it is an issue of law, we exercise plenary 
review over the District Court's holding that the McCarran 
Act does not proscribe Highmark's Lanham Act claims. 
United States v. Southeastern Pa. Transp. Auth., 235 F.3d 
817, 822 (3d Cir. 2000). The McCarran Act provides that 
"[n]o Act of Congress shall be construed to invalidate, 
impair, or supersede any law enacted by any State for the 
purpose of regulating the business of insurance . . ." 15 
U.S.C. S 1012(b). To determine whether the McCarran Act 
applies, this Court considers the threshold question to be 
whether the activity complained of constitutes the 
"business of insurance." Sabo v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 
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137 F.3d 185, 191 (3d Cir. 1998). If the activity does not 
constitute the "business of insurance," then the McCarran 
Act does not apply. Id. at 190. If, on the other hand, the 
activity does constitute the "business of insurance," we 
then look to whether S 1012(b) precludes a federal cause of 
action. Id. at 189. Federal jurisdiction is barred if three 
requirements are met: (1) the federal law at issue does not 
specifically relate to the business of insurance; (2) the state 
law regulating the activity was enacted for the purpose of 
regulating the business of insurance; and (3) applying 
federal law would invalidate, impair, or supersede the state 
law. Id. 
 
As for the threshold question, the action complained of -- 
the advertising -- constitutes part of the business of 
insurance. The District Court, without discussion, 
concluded that the advertising practices of the parties 
involved the business of insurance. Although we are not 
referred to any appellate case squarely on point, we 
perceive no error in this conclusion. The Ad dealt with the 
scope and services offered by the insurers to their 
subscribers and thus concerned the "business of 
insurance." See, e.g., Fed. Trade Comm'n v. Nat'l Cas. Co., 
357 U.S. 560, 562-63 (1958); accord Sec. & Exch. Comm'n 
v. Nat'l Sec., Inc., 393 U.S. 453, 460, (1969) (advertising is 
the business of insurance).1 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Twenty-five years after National Casualty  the Supreme Court of the 
United States laid out a three-pronged test for determining what is the 
"business of insurance" for purposes of deciding whether the McCarran 
Act precludes application of federal antitrust law. Union Labor Life Ins. 
Co. v. Pireno, 458 U.S. 119 (1982). These prongs are first, whether the 
practice transfers or spreads a policyholder's risk; second, whether the 
practice is an integral part of the policy relationship between the 
insurer 
and the insured; and third, whether the practice is limited to entities 
within the insurance industry. Id. at 129. Although it could be argued 
that Pireno impliedly overruled National Casualty, United States 
Department of Treasury v. Fabe, 508 U.S. 491 (1993), casts doubt upon 
that interpretation. In Fabe the Court noted that Pireno dealt with the 
McCarran Act's effect on antitrust laws, which the Court found readily 
distinguishable from other laws. Id. at 504. This is because there are two 
separate clauses in the McCarran Act. According to the Supreme Court, 
the second clause, which proscribes application of antitrust laws, is 
 
                                7 
  
Concluding that advertising constitutes the business of 
insurance, we must look to whether the three statutory 
requirements bar federal jurisdiction. We need not tarry 
long on the first two requirements. The Lanham Act under 
which this suit is brought does not specifically or otherwise 
relate to the business of insurance. As for the second 
requirement, Pennsylvania enacted the Unfair Insurance 
Practices Act (the UIPA) in 1974 and expressly stated its 
policy as follows: 
 
       The purpose of this act is to regulate trade practices in 
       the business of insurance in accordance with the 
       intent of congress as expressed in the [McCarran- 
       Ferguson Act], by defining or providing for the 
       determination of all such practices in this state which 
       constitute unfair methods of competition or unfair or 
       deceptive acts or practices and by prohibiting the trade 
       practices so defined or determined. 
 
40 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. S 1171.2 (1999)(footnote omitted). 
Judge Standish for the District Court recognized that 
Pennsylvania enacted the UIPA to regulate the business of 
insurance. Its plain language having done so, we agree. 
 
The more difficult question is in the third requirement -- 
does application of the Lanham Act invalidate, impair, or 
supersede the state regulation of deceptive and false 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
more "narrowly circumscribed" than the first clause, which deals with 
federal laws in general. Id. Only the first clause is pertinent in this 
case. 
 
The general clause (the first clause) provides:"[n]o Act of Congress 
shall be construed to invalidate, impair, or supersede any law enacted by 
any State for the purpose of regulating the business of insurance . . . ." 
The Supreme Court sees a distinction between the"business of 
insurance" and laws that serve the purpose  of regulating the business of 
insurance. This distinction makes it difficult, if not impossible, to 
apply 
Pireno to insurance advertising under the Lanham Act, because the 
Lanham Act is a general law controlled by the first clause. In a case on 
point, a South Carolina District Court concluded that National Casualty 
remains good law, and held that laws regulating insurance advertising 
are laws whose purpose is to regulate the business of insurance. Colonial 
Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. American Family Life Assurance Co., 846 F. 
Supp. 454, 460 (D.S.C. 1994). 
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practices in violation of the McCarran Act? The District 
Court concluded that it does not and we again agree. 
 
A federal law impairs a state law if: (1) it directly conflicts 
with the state law; (2) applying federal law would frustrate 
any declared state policy; or (3) applying federal law would 
interfere with a state's administrative regime. Humana Inc. 
v. Forsyth, 525 U.S. 299, 310 (1999). A federal law 
supersedes a state law if it "displace[s] (and thus render[s] 
ineffective) [state law] while providing for a substitute rule." 
Id. at 307. UPMC argues that the policy of the UIPA is 
exclusive and that only the Pennsylvania Legislature can 
define or provide for the determination of all unfair 
insurance practices, "not Congress or the federal courts." 
UPMC claims that applying the Lanham Act here would 
impair or supersede Pennsylvania law. 
 
The District Court noted that the UIPA is enforceable only 
by the State Commissioner of Insurance and confers no 
private right of action. However, it also observed that state 
law actions for deceit and fraud in connection with the 
insurance industry are not barred, and are available to 
provide remedies for victims of illegal insurance practices. 
Pennsylvania's allowance of private actions like these to 
proceed casts doubt upon the UIPA's exclusivity. 
 
Pekular v. Eich, a decision of a Pennsylvania appellate 
court, supports the District Court's finding. The court in 
Pekular allowed plaintiff 's common law claims of fraud and 
deceit to proceed, along with a claim under the 
Pennsylvania Unfair Trade Practices Consumer Protection 
Law (CPL), despite the UIPA. 513 A.2d 427 (Pa. Super. Ct. 
1986). By allowing the common law and the CPL to define 
unfair trade practices, the court tacitly acknowledged that 
the UIPA is not exclusive. "[T]he UIPA contains no provision 
either stating or implying that the power vested in the 
Insurance Commissioner represents the exclusive means by 
which an insurer's unfair or deceptive acts are to be 
penalized . . . ." Id. at 434. It is also worth noting that since 
the decision in Pekular fifteen years ago, the state 
legislature has had more than enough time to address 
whatever exclusivity might exist in this policy. Its failure to 
do so is further evidence that there is no such exclusive 
policy. 
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Moreover, this Court has also recognized the lack of UIPA 
exclusivity. In ruling that a federal court could consider a 
private RICO claim despite the UIPA, the Court noted that 
it found no indication, through legislative intent or judicial 
interpretation, "that Pennsylvania's non-recognition of a 
private remedy under the UIPA represents a reasoned state 
policy of exclusive administrative enforcement or that the 
vindication of UIPA norms should be limited or rare." Sabo, 
137 F.3d at 195. Although vindication of UIPA norms came 
through RICO in Sabo, those norms were inherently defined 
by RICO, not the UIPA. Remarkably, UPMC tries to gainsay 
the obvious, by arguing that "[a]lthough a RICO claim may 
provide a remedy for conduct that falls under the rubric of 
the UIPA, a court adjudicating a RICO claim will not 
necessarily `determine' whether such conduct constitutes 
an `unfair method of competition' or an `unfair or deceptive 
act or practice' in the insurance industry." To state that 
proposition illustrates its invalidity. By its very nature, a 
company that violates the RICO statute has participated in 
an unfair method of competition. UPMC's assertion is akin 
to a claim that a conviction of murder is not necessarily a 
finding that such a person is guilty of a violent crime. 
Allowing Highmark's private action to proceed under the 
Lanham Act is merely a logical extension of Sabo , and not 
the huge leap UPMC would make of it. 
 
After examining the federal legislation and Pennsylvania's 
UIPA, the District Court found that the Lanham Act neither 
conflicts with UIPA nor invalidates, impairs, or supersedes 
its provisions. The District Court therefore concluded that 
the McCarran Act does not bar the application of the 
Lanham Act provisions to such practices. Not only does the 
Lanham Act not invalidate, impair, or supersede the UIPA, 
or interfere with the State Commissioner's enforcement of 
its provisions, it also supports the State's efforts to correct 
such practices by allowing private actions in the federal 
courts. 
 
UPMC contends that the Lanham Act supersedes 
Pennsylvania law by providing different standards of 
liability than the UIPA, and therefore Highmark's Lanham 
Act claim interferes with Pennsylvania's administrative 
regime in violation of the McCarran Act. As UPMC observes, 
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the standard to obtain a permanent injunction under the 
Lanham Act is less formidable than under the UIPA. UPMC 
claims the UIPA is thus rendered literally ineffective (i.e., 
superseded) by the Lanham Act because plaintiffs, given a 
choice, will elect to file claims with an easier burden of 
proof. This argument, however, also ignores precedent. 
 
If different standards of liability were enough to render 
the UIPA ineffective under the McCarran Act, then this 
Court would not have allowed RICO claims to proceed in 
Sabo. As this Court noted in Sabo, the UIPA provides for 
actions solely through the Pennsylvania Insurance 
Commissioner, and not privately. 137 F.3d at 192. Thus, 
vindication of UIPA norms would seemingly be rare. 
Allowing private actions when none is provided by state law 
permits the insurance commissioner to proceed and also 
provides a victim of deception a private cause of action. 
Obviously, all things being equal, victims would much 
rather file a private cause of action than rely on an 
administrative process. In Sabo, we allowed the RICO 
claimant to proceed despite the UIPA. Pennsylvania state 
courts also have allowed private actions under state 
common and statutory law. See, e.g., Pekular v. Eich, 513 
A.2d 427 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986). In light of these precedents, 
the District Court did not err in holding that the UIPA is 
not superseded by the Lanham Act. 
 
UPMC also argues that the more liberal remedies 
provided by the Lanham Act impair Pennsylvania's 
administrative scheme, and should bar Highmark's Lanham 
Act claim. In Sabo, this Court stated that it would "leave for 
another day the question of whether different federal and 
state remedies could ever be the basis for preclusion under 
the Act." 137 F.3d at 195. More liberal remedies are found 
under RICO than the UIPA. See id. at 192-93 (RICO's 
remedies authorize awarding treble damages, attorney's 
fees, and costs). This did not prevent the Court from 
allowing the RICO claim to proceed, as it noted that 
Pennsylvania's general consumer protection statute 
(available as a cause of action), like RICO, allows for treble 
damages. Id. at 195. The Sabo Court did not limit itself to 
a RICO-UIPA comparison, and we will not limit ourselves to 
a Lanham Act-UIPA comparison. 
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Although the Lanham Act provides stronger remedies 
than the UIPA, compare 15 U.S.C. S 1117(a) (allowing 
recovery of defendant's profits, unlimited damages, and 
court costs) with 40 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.SS 1171.9, 1171.11 
(1999) (allowing orders enjoining the unlawful activity, 
suspension or revocation of the defendant's license, and 
capping monetary awards), the point of reference should 
also include Pennsylvania common law remedies, as the 
Court included in Sabo. Highmark's common law claims 
include tortious interference with potential contractual 
relations, and assuming it could bring such an action, the 
Lanham Act's remedies do not appear unduly severe. 
Moreover, Pennsylvania allows for punitive damages for a 
tortious interference with a prospective business 
relationship claim. See SHV Coal, Inc. v. Continental Grain 
Co., 587 A.2d 702 (Pa. 1991). Punitive damages can easily 
meet, if not exceed, Lanham Act damages. The UIPA itself, 
in light of its non-exclusive nature, does not provide a basis 
for the Court to determine if different federal and state 
remedies can be a basis for preclusion under the McCarran 
Act. 
 
Finally, UPMC argues that common law claims are not 
available to insurers like Highmark under Pennsylvania 
law, and allowing Highmark's Lanham Act claim to proceed 
impairs Pennsylvania's administrative scheme. As UPMC 
correctly notes, Pennsylvania courts have not yet squarely 
decided whether insurers can bring private false advertising 
claims. Again, however, precedent indicates that such 
claims would be allowed. As the Pekular court stated, when 
finding common law remedies and the UIPA to coexist,"we 
do not read [precedent] to preclude existing common law 
remedies such as fraud and deceit." 513 A.2d at 431. 
UPMC argues that this statement refers only to fraud and 
deceit actions. The Court's language, however, is not so 
narrowly drawn. It speaks of "existing common law 
remedies" and illustrates them with fraud and deceit. There 
is no reason to believe that Highmark's common law claims, 
already in existence at the time of the UIPA enactment, 
would be barred by Pennsylvania's courts. See Metro. Prop. 
& Liab. Ins. Co. v. Ins. Comm'r, 580 A.2d 300, 303 (Pa. 
1990)(finding that provisions of the UIPA are not all 
encompassing and that common law remedy of rescission is 
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not precluded by UIPA); Baker v. Pa. Nat'l Mut. Cas. Ins. 
Co., 559 A.2d 914, 915-16 n.1 (Pa. 1989)(noting that the 
UIPA does not provide the exclusive remedy in cases 
involving improper conduct on the part of insurance 
companies); Commonwealth v. Allstate Ins. Co. , 729 A.2d 
135, 139-40 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1999)(finding UIPA is not the 
exclusive remedy for fraudulent insurance practices). 
Accordingly, the District Court committed no error in 
rejecting UPMC's arguments that this action is barred by 
the McCarran Act.2 
 
III. 
 
Notwithstanding subject matter jurisdiction in the federal 
District Court,3 UPMC contends that the District Court 
erred in granting the preliminary injunction. We use a 
three-part standard to review the District Court's decision. 
The ultimate decision to grant the preliminary injunction is 
reviewed for abuse of discretion; the District Court's 
findings of fact are reviewed for clear error; and the District 
Court's conclusions of law receive plenary review. Warner- 
Lambert Co. v. Breathasure, Inc., 204 F.3d 87, 89 n.1 (3d 
Cir. 2000). 
 
A. 
 
Four factors are considered in determining whether to 
grant a preliminary injunction: (1) whether the movant has 
a reasonable probability of success on the merits; (2) 
whether the movant will be irreparably harmed by denying 
the injunction; (3) whether there will be greater harm to the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. It is worth noting that, although the cases did not discuss possible 
McCarran-Ferguson preclusion, this Court, and the District Courts in 
this Circuit, have routinely exercised jurisdiction over Lanham Act 
claims involving the insurance industry. See, e.g., U.S. Healthcare, Inc. 
v. 
Blue Cross, 898 F.2d 914 (3d Cir. 1990); American Fidelity & Liberty Ins. 
Co. v. American Fidelity Group, 2000 WL 1385899, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 
25, 2000); Guardian Life Ins. Co. v. American Guardian Life Assurance 
Co., 943 F. Supp. 509 (E.D. Pa. 1996). 
 
3. We have appellate jurisdiction, although the order before us is 
interlocutory. 28 U.S.C. S 1292(a)(1) permits an appeal from an order 
granting an injunction. 
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nonmoving party if the injunction is granted; and (4) 
whether granting the injunction is in the public interest. 
ACLU v. Reno, 217 F.3d 162, 172 (3d Cir. 2000). Although 
it is not clear from its brief, UPMC seems to challenge only 
the District Court's finding that Highmark has a reasonable 
probability of succeeding on the merits. Accordingly, that is 
the only finding we will address. 
 
The District Court found that Highmark has a reasonable 
probability of succeeding on the merits. To establish its 
Lanham Act claim, Highmark must show: (1) the defendant 
made false or misleading statements about the plaintiff 's 
product; (2) there is actual deception or a tendency to 
deceive a substantial portion of the intended audience; (3) 
the deception is material in that it is likely to influence 
purchasing decisions; (4) the advertised goods traveled in 
interstate commerce; and (5) there is a likelihood of injury 
to the plaintiff, e.g., declining sales and loss of good will. 
Breathasure, 204 F.3d at 91-92. 
 
There are two ways to prove a false advertising claim 
under the Lanham Act. Either the advertisement must be 
literally false, or it must be literally true but misleading to 
the consumer. Castrol Inc. v. Pennzoil Co., 987 F.2d 939, 
943 (3d Cir. 1993). If an advertisement is literally false, the 
plaintiff does not have to prove actual consumer deception. 
Id. If, on the other hand, an advertisement is literally true 
but misleading, the plaintiff must prove actual deception by 
a preponderance of the evidence. Id. If a claim is literally 
true, a plaintiff " `cannot obtain relief by arguing how 
consumers could react; it must show how consumers 
actually do react.' " Id. (quoting Sandoz Pharm. Corp. v. 
Richardson-Vicks, Inc., 902 F.2d 222, 228-29 (3d Cir. 
1990)). 
 
The District Court found nine separate claims made in 
the UPMC ad false and, in the alternative, misleading: 
 
       (1) Reference to the Highmark plan as 
       "CommunityBlue." The District Court found that 
       "CommunityBlue" is in fact a service mark for 
       three of Highmark's network plans, which includes 
       "CommunityBlue Direct," the plan actually being 
       offered to Allegheny County employees. 
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       (2) Highmark provides service only in 10 hospitals in 
       Allegheny County, as compared to 18 hospitals 
       offered by UPMC. The Court found that Highmark 
       actually offers the services of 16 hospitals, when 
       rehabilitation and psychiatric facilities are 
       included.4 
 
       (3) Highmark may send members to out-of-state 
       hospitals for some types of care available in 
       Allegheny County. The Court found that Highmark 
       does not send subscribers to out-of-state hospitals 
       for care available in Allegheny County. 
 
       (4) Doctors must obtain approval from Highmark 
       before ordering some tests, admitting members to 
       the hospital, and making other key medical 
       decisions. The Court found that Highmark does 
       not make medical decisions for its subscribers. 
 
       (5) UPMC does not limit self-referrals to its network 
       specialists. The Court found that the $25 co- 
       payment required by UPMC for such self-referrals 
       is in fact a limitation. Further, the Court found 
       that this representation implied that Highmark 
       limits self-referrals; the Court found that 
       Highmark did not. 
 
The remaining four of the nine claims in the UPMC Ad 
that the District Court found false and misleading centered 
around the Ad's use of the word "access." The Ad claims 
that CommunityBlue Direct offers no access to specialty 
care at several named facilities, no access to several "world- 
renowned physicians," and no access to any services at 
Magee-Womens Hospital. The Ad also claims that 
CommunityBlue offers access to "only certain services" at 
Children's Hospital. 
 
The District Court ruled that "access" has a plain 
meaning, applicable in this case. The Merriam-Webster 
Dictionary defines "access" as the "capacity to enter or 
approach." THE MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY 23 (5th ed. 
1997). The District Court's explanation on its face seems 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. UPMC included rehabilitation and psychiatric facilities in determining 
the number of hospitals it offers. 
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appropriate, as the Ad was addressed to the public and not 
the industry. The District Court, using this plain meaning, 
determined that most of the Ad's claims relating to access 
were false and misleading because CommunityBlue Direct 
subscribers do indeed have access to the disputed facilities 
and world-renowned doctors, but at a lower level of benefits 
(that is, with additional out-of-pocket costs). UPMC argues 
that the Court should not have defined "access" according 
to its plain meaning, but rather should have looked to 
objective industry standards to construe the term. 
 
According to UPMC, the objective industry standard 
definition of "access" is "access without additional cost to 
the subscriber." Under this definition, UPMC claims, its Ad 
is both literally true and not misleading. There is not 
enough evidence to determine whether UPMC in fact offers 
the objective industry standard definition.5 There are 
decisions that support UPMC's contention that industry 
standards are relevant in determining whether the use of 
the term "access" was literally false. See, e.g., Castrol, 799 
F. Supp. at 436 ("In order to determine whether a claim is 
literally false, courts have looked to objective industry 
standards rather than subjective standards of the party 
making the comparison."); Tire Kingdom, Inc. v. Morgan Tire 
& Auto, Inc., 915 F. Supp. 360, 365-66 (S.D. Fla. 1996) ("In 
making a threshold determination concerning the falsity of 
a challenged advertisement under the Lanham Act, 
examining the industry standard is appropriate."); American 
Rockwool, Inc. v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 640 F. 
Supp. 1411, 1443 (E.D.N.C. 1986) ("In the view of the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. In arguing for its definition, UPMC points only to a previous 
advertisement by Highmark that similarly used the term "access." More 
evidence is needed to prove its definition is the objective industry 
standard. For instance, in addition to competitors' advertisements, the 
defendant in Illinois Bell Telephone Co. v. MCI Telecommunications Corp. 
produced employee testimony and definitions used by expert sources in 
the industry. 1996 WL 717466, *4 (N.D. Ill. 1996). In Castrol Inc. v. 
Pennzoil Co., the District Court heard expert testimony to help it 
determine the industry standard. 799 F. Supp. 424, 437 (D. N.J. 1992). 
One advertisement is not sufficient proof of an industry standard. 
However, we note that the burden of proving the objective industry 
standard definition rests on the plaintiff and not on the defendant. Id. 
at 
436. 
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court, [objective industry standards] must be used in order 
to find a violation of the Lanham Act."). However, as there 
are several other claims in the Ad that support the District 
Court's granting the preliminary injunction, we need not 
decide this issue today. 
 
We now review the facts considered by the District Court 
in determining that Highmark has a reasonable probability 
of success on the merits. We see no need to discuss each 
of the claims presented by Highmark, and limit ourselves to 
the most obviously deceptive. 
 
The UPMC ad asserts that CommunityBlue Direct "[m]ay 
send members to out-of-state hospitals for some types of 
care available" in Western Pennsylvania. UPMC does not 
even argue that it has evidence that this takes place; 
instead, it argues that Highmark has the means and motive 
to direct patients to out-of-state hospitals. Means and 
motive are not sufficient to prove the statement true, and 
the District Court did not clearly err in finding this claim 
literally false. 
 
The UPMC ad also asserts that UPMC does not "limit self- 
referrals to our network specialists." The District Court 
found that the $25 co-payment is indeed a limitation, and 
thus this claim is also literally false. This ruling likewise is 
not clearly erroneous. 
 
Of most importance, the Ad asserts that CommunityBlue 
Direct provides "[a]ccess to only certain services at 
Children's Hospital." This claim is literally false, because 
Children's Hospital is actually part of the CommunityBlue 
Direct network. UPMC again argues that the claim is true, 
because Highmark has the "incentives and means to steer 
patients away from Children's Hospital." Without presenting 
evidence that Highmark is actually diverting patients from 
Children's Hospital, any incentives and means it may have 
to do so are irrelevant. 
 
This assertion pertaining to Children's Hospital is of 
paramount importance because it speaks directly to the 
materiality and likelihood of injury components of 
Highmark's Lanham Act claim. As Judge Roth has noted, 
"[c]onsumer survey evidence is extremely helpful in 
determining whether an allegedly false statement is 
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material." Castrol, 987 F.2d at 954 (Roth, J., dissenting). 
Patricia Ann Liebman, the Chief Executive Officer of UPMC, 
testified that at informational meetings with the non-union 
employees of Allegheny County, the employees specifically 
asked questions about the Children's Hospital claim. 
Liebman also testified that Children's Hospital is an 
important institution for health plans offering services in 
Western Pennsylvania; a lack of access to the Hospital will 
influence the plan that employees with children will choose. 
In light of such testimony, the District Court did not err in 
finding the claim material or in finding that Highmark has 
a reasonable probability of succeeding on the merits. 
Accordingly, the District Court did not abuse its discretion 
in issuing the preliminary injunction. Moreover, on an 
application for preliminary injunction, the plaintiff need 
only prove a prima facie case, not a certainty that he or she 
will win. 11A Wright, Miller & Kane, Federal Practice and 
Procedure: Civil 2d S 2948.3. 
 
B. 
 
Before concluding, we turn to UPMC's argument that the 
District Court did not address -- unclean hands. UPMC 
argues that Highmark should be barred from bringing its 
Lanham Act claim because of the equitable doctrine of 
unclean hands. In July 1999, Highmark ran an 
advertisement in the Post-Gazette claiming to be the only 
health care plan offering "access" to five local hospitals 
ranked among America's best. UPMC claims that 
Highmark, having used the term "access" the same way 
UPMC did in the Ad before us, should not be heard now to 
complain about the UPMC ad. We reject this argument. 
 
The equitable doctrine of unclean hands applies when a 
party seeking relief has committed an unconscionable act 
immediately related to the equity the party seeks in respect 
to the litigation. Keystone Driller Co. v. General Excavator 
Co., 290 U.S. 240, 245 (1933). The doctrine is applicable in 
actions seeking relief under the Lanham Act. Ames Publ'g 
Co. v. Walker-Davis Publ'n, Inc., 372 F. Supp. 1, 13 (E.D. 
Pa. 1974). Courts, however, do not close their doors when 
plaintiff 's misconduct has "no relation to anything involved 
in the suit, but only for such violations of conscience as in 
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6. Thus, if we wish to, we can apply the doctrine. Harris v. City of 
Philadelphia, 47 F.3d 1333, 1342 (3d Cir. 1995); Gaudiosi v. Mellon, 269 
F.2d 873, 881 (3d Cir. 1959). 
some measure affect the equitable relations between the 
parties in respect of something brought before the court for 
adjudication." Keystone Driller, 290 U.S. at 245. The nexus 
"between the misconduct and the claim must be close." In 
re New Valley Corp., 181 F.3d 517, 525 (3d Cir. 1999). 
 
Although we may sua sponte apply the doctrine,6 we 
choose not to do it. Highmark's inappropriate use of a term 
in its 1999 advertisement does not excuse current deceptive 
and misleading advertisements to the public. 
 
IV. CONCLUSION 
 
In summary, we conclude that the plaintiff offered 
sufficient evidence to prove that the challenged activities 
substantially affected interstate commerce. Highmark also 
established that the McCarran Act did not preclude relief 
under the Lanham Act for the deceptive and misleading 
representations in UPMC's February 2001 Ad. Finally, the 
District Court did not abuse its discretion in granting 
Highmark's application for a preliminary injunction. Costs 
taxed against the appellant, UPMC. 
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